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many aspects in which the great moral evolution is made manifest, and an infinitely larger sense of human solidarity has developed. Cleanliness is for the body what dignity is for the soul, and display is for the body what vanity is for the mind. Display is an egotistical waste of an enormous quantity of labor directed to satisfy the vanity of a few; cleanliness, on the other hand, is a social duty. The man who merely endeavors to be dressed sumptuously is an egotist whose only aim is to make an impression; the man who attends to his own cleanliness is a man who has attained to a finer sense of his physical dignity, and who begins to carry into effect the principle of solidarity, the principle that a man must contribute by the care of his own body to the decency and hygiene of all society.

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DISCUSSIONS.

MR. HAYWARD'S EVALUATION OF PROFESSOR SIDGWICK'S ETHICS.

In the January number of the *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS*, Mr. F. H. Hayward devotes an article to setting forth the "true significance" of Professor Sidgwick's "Methods of Ethics," and I should like to be allowed to make a few observations on his view.

Mr. Hayward begins by describing Professor Sidgwick as in aim and sympathies an empiricist, "unconscious perhaps that the irruptive forces [of Idealism] had broken into the citadel of his own thought"; "unconsciously influenced" [by Kant, and his school.]

But it is I think undoubted that there has never been a teacher who has exhibited more clearly, thoroughly, and unsparingly the utter incoherence of empiricism. It would be a sheer impossibility, one would imagine, for any intelligent pupil of Professor Sidgwick's, or student of his writings, to be an empiricist in ethics. Again, substantial acceptance of Kant's Categorical Imperative as far as it goes, is explicitly set forth, in the "Methods of Ethics" (*cf.* p. 386, etc., 5th Ed.), and "the leading *motif* of

Idealism" (according to Mr. Hayward) *i. e.*, "emphasis on rationality of conduct," is the declared starting point of the "Methods." See, *e. g.*, the Preface to the first edition, where the author speaks of the "assumption (which seems to be made implicitly in all ethical reasoning) that there is something under any given circumstances which it is right or reasonable to do, etc." And on page 1 (of the fifth edition) we are told that by a "Method of Ethics" is meant "any rational procedure by which we determine what it is right" for human beings to do, while the explicit identification of *Right* with *Reasonable* conduct runs through the book.

And how far from "unconscious" was the admission of "Kantian Elements," is shown by the account which Professor Sidgwick gives of the development in his thought of the view which he had reached and which is set forth in his book. We learn from it (*cf.* Preface to sixth edition) that a careful re-consideration of Kant's ethical theory and acceptance of his fundamental principle as self-evident and important, was an essential stage in the author's thought. "He has admitted," says Mr. Hayward, "that the reasonableness of an act supplies a motive to its performance"; and, in another place, "Here the emphasis on Reason is even startling." But why *admitted*, why *startling*, when the announced purpose of the whole book is to show how by a rational procedure, rational action may be ascertained? Still the recognition that the ethical end, method and criterion must be reasonable, however fully admitted or strongly emphasized, can no more furnish a code of maxims, a rule of procedure, or even a criterion of right action, than the full admission that some statements are true, and an emphatic announcement that we seek the truth, can furnish a standard of truth, or concrete laws of science. We are still left asking, in the one case, *What* is it that it is reasonable to do? in the other, *Which* are the statements that are to be believed?

It is the answer to *this* question which shows whether an Ethical thinker is an Intuitionist or Perfectionist, or Egoist, or Utilitarian, as the case may be.

To identify rightness with reasonableness (p. 179) is no bar to Hedonism, Egoistic or Universalistic. The position of any Ethical Hedonist who is a reasoning being is, that being both rational and sensitive, he recognizes the presence of happiness and absence of misery as an end which, because he is sensitive, it is right and reasonable for him to seek. Would a sensitive being act rationally in disregarding pain and pleasure? A Dogmatic Intuitionist

may similarly say with Butler, that what is right and reasonable, is to do justice, speak truth, and promote the happiness of others. A "Perfectionist" may say that the general perfection of human society is the right and reasonable end of individual action. Of course the question, What does Perfection consist in? still remains to be answered.

In § VII., on *Utilitarianism*, (it is to be remembered that Professor Sidgwick is a declared Utilitarian or Universalistic Hedonist) Mr. Hayward makes no reference to the distinctive principle of Universalistic (as opposed to Egoistic) Hedonism, the principle, that is, of Rational Benevolence—that "General Happiness is the right end of action." The principle here referred to by Mr. Hayward, that "Whatever action any of us judges to be right for himself, he implicitly judges to be right for all similar persons in similar circumstances," has no special applicability to either system of Hedonism, and is merely a principle of impartiality, an expression of the universality of application which is a characteristic of any and every Law.

In § VIII. (*The Summum Bonum*), Mr. Hayward says that to the question, What is Rightness? there can only be two answers—the Hedonistic (that it is Happiness)—and the Idealistic—that it is Rightness generalized—that is, that it is *Perfect Life*, Rightness everywhere.

This is indeed to make Ought or Right an *ultimate* notion in the sense of being both *first* and *last*; and to offer, as the end of action, the unanalyzable notion which is also our starting point. It gives us no guidance, no criterion. We are still at the acknowledged point of departure of all ethical inquiry. What we want is the content, as well as the form, of Right Conduct. By what characteristics are we to recognize or test *Right*, or its superlative, *Perfection*? However willing and anxious we may be to do what we ought, of what use is that, unless we have some means of recognizing what it is that we ought to do?

If we cannot point to any characteristic, cannot give a reason for the faith that is in us, but proceed merely instinctively and take as our motto *Solvitur ambulando*, then of course we may be good men and true, but we can lay no claim to ethical science or practical philosophy.

I should quite agree with Mr. Hayward that to the question, What is Rightness? there can be but two sorts of answer—(1) the Hedonistic (that it is what contributes to Happiness)—

an answer which is significant and indicates a content; (2) the Idealistic (in Mr. Hayward's sense of Idealistic) that it is Rightness—which is frankly tautological, of no more use than the Law of Identity expressed as *A is A*, regarded as a test of truth.

Mr. Hayward thinks that the idea of *Desert* is a fatal stumbling-block in the way of the Hedonist because (as Kant says), "A good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition of being worthy of happiness," and "the sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never *give pleasure* to an impartial rational spectator."

How strange—the bar to Hedonism is found in the imperative demand that righteousness should be rewarded by *pleasure*, and this because otherwise the rational impartial spectator will not be *pleased*. Is not this the very quintessence of Hedonism, taking pleasure both as ultimate good and as moral criterion? Why should Desert be rewarded by mere happiness if happiness is the "sorriest of social ends"? If Perfection is so much better why is it not its own reward? A reward is that which is valuable for its own sake. And why should the demand be enforced by reference to the *pleasure* of the spectator? Again (to mention a small point) how is Desert to be described, measured or recognized, if all we know in Ethics is that Right is Right? And why, again, should we hope as Mr. Hayward does, p. 185, that Happiness is to be "Man's ultimate lot"? And further, how does even the "Idealist" moralist prove that Desert *will* be rewarded?

I understand Mr. Hayward to say on p. 185 that in Kant's view, it is not a man's duty to seek happiness for himself *or for others*—but Kant certainly does argue that it is our duty to take the *Happiness* of others as our end.

Cf. Kant's "Critique of Practical Reason, etc.," Abbott's translation, 1879. "It is impossible to *will* that such a principle [that of not concerning oneself with the Happiness of others] should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, etc." p. 58.

"To be beneficent when we can is a duty," p. 18.

"The natural end which all men have is their own happiness . . . the ends of any subject which is an end in himself ought as far as possible to be *my* ends also," p. 69. And in the Canon of Pure Reason (Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's translation, 1876), Kant clearly makes Happiness the end of all

action—"all hoping has happiness for its object," p. 488. (*cf.* "To secure one's own happiness is a duty, at least indirectly").

The answer to the great question, *What ought I to do?* is, "Do that which will render thee worthy of happiness," p. 490. "Happiness therefore in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings (whereby they are made worthy of happiness) constitutes alone the supreme good of a world into which we absolutely must transport ourselves according to the commands of pure but practical reason," p. 493. And in the Scheme of Duties in the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics he gives as "my Duty," the promotion of the End of others (their happiness).

If there is a great gulf fixed between Hedonism and any so-called *Idealistic*—that is as here explained *Rational*—System of Ethics, why does Mr. Hayward, on p. 183, speak of Hedonism as a *reasonable* system? There seems on his view to be nothing whatever to be said about the "Idealistic" view except that it is reasonable—and nothing to be said about *reasonable* except that it *is* reasonable—if so, and Hedonism is "reasonable" too, what is the precise point of distinction? It is not that Philosophy has presented the world with a self-consistent system of Idealistic Ethics, while it has "failed to present the world with a self-consistent ethical system based on Pleasure," (p. 186)—for where have we such an "Idealist" system?

Professor Sidgwick shows how Intuitionism develops to the Philosophical form (as in Clarke, Butler, Kant), one of the fundamental axioms of which is that Principle of Rational Benevolence that is seen to furnish an Intuitional basis of Utilitarianism; and this articulation of Intuitionism with Utilitarianism—of Rationalism with Hedonism—seems to me to be one of the most brilliant, profound, and undeniably constructive, achievements of modern ethical thought.

With reference to Mr. Hayward's complaint that Professor Sidgwick, in his "Methods of Ethics" "never faces the weighty metaphysical arguments of Green and Green's successors," that he devotes so few remarks to Green, and does not treat his view with sufficient seriousness and respect, it may be said (1) that while the "Methods of Ethics" was published in 1874, Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics" did not appear until 1883 (the third edition of the "Methods" came out in 1884); (2) that Professor Sidgwick expressly confines himself in the "Methods" to the consideration of Ethics *as a Science*, regarding detailed examination

of questions that are distinctly metaphysical as beyond the scope of his work, as conceived by himself; (3) he does in the later editions of the "Methods," devote some three or four pages at least to a discussion of Green's view *eo nomine* in as far as it bears upon his own treatment. And (4) since according to Green "the one unconditional good is the good will, and 'when we come to ask ourselves what are the essential forms in which the will for true good (which is the will to be good) must appear' our answer must 'follow the lines of the Greek classification of virtues,' " it appears that it is not only in the passages which refer to Green specifically that the views held by him come under consideration.*

Further it may be observed that *amount* of criticism is not so important as its quality; and finally every sentence in the "Methods of Ethics" in which Green is referred to seems to me to be marked by the most perfect "seriousness and respect."

"As a constructive ethical work," says Mr. Hayward, "the 'Methods of Ethics' is confessedly a failure." But by whose confession? Certainly not the author's, (*pace* the epigrammatic Postscript) and I think it would not be rash to add, Certainly not that of any one who has taken the trouble to master the relation between Intuitionism and Benthamite Utilitarianism which is worked out with such insight, patience and completeness in Books III. and IV., and in view of which the maintenance of any theoretical opposition between Common Sense Morality and the principle of Rational Benevolence must, I imagine, be regarded as a mere matter of unintelligence.

With respect to the author's own conception of the relation between Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism—in other words the reconciliation of Duty and Self-Interest (which for any practice or any theory is no mere problem of words)—he states his view to be, that while the reasonableness of Self-Love and of Rational Benevolence appear self-evident† he has no similar "intuition, claiming to be clear and certain that the performance of duty will be adequately rewarded and its violation punished." But even if the best ground that can be given for believing in such a reconciliation of Duty and Interest should be that without it we are

*Green's metaphysical view is fully and carefully discussed by Professor Sidgwick in two articles in *Mind*.

†Mr. Hayward allows (p. 176) that these maxims "have made out a good claim to validity."

left with a fundamental contradiction in Ethics, it may, he holds, still be maintained that ethical science is no worse off than physical science, in which "propositions are commonly taken to be universally true, which yet seem to rest on no other grounds than that we have a strong disposition to accept them, and that they are indispensable to the systematic coherence of our beliefs."

From which it appears that Professor Sidgwick considered the logical foundation of Rational Hedonism to be at least as trustworthy as that of Physical Science.

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A REPLY.

Miss Jones, whose long acquaintance with the late Professor Sidgwick has given her unusual facilities for arriving at a correct view of the "Methods of Ethics," has criticised my interpretation with considerable vigor. Readers of Sidgwick's work seem fated to differ as to its import, a result for which that aspect of the writer's philosophy which I have ventured to call "eclecticism" is, no doubt, responsible.

The impression which I received on first reading the "Methods of Ethics" was that the writer's sympathies (perhaps the result of early training) were probably empiricist, but that he had become acutely conscious that Empiricism had to be supplemented by constructive principles drawn from other sources. That impression may have been entirely mistaken, and based upon the common association between Hedonism and Empiricism. It is dangerous, I admit, to infer a writer's general Philosophical attitude from his ethical work. Still, Sidgwick's scrupulous avoidance of metaphysics, the closeness of his touch to common consciousness, the admission of different *prima facie* rational methods of ethics, and above all the almost point-for-point agreement and the emphatic approval of an undoubted empiricist like Dr. Bain (*Mind*, 1876, p. 179) suggests certain affinity with Empiricism. If English philosophy is empiricist in tone; if the words of Falkenberg quoted by me correctly describe that philosophy; and if those words are to some extent applicable to Sidgwick also, then my description of him as possessed of empiricist sympathies was not so absurd as Miss Jones appears to think. On the other hand we find